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Abstract
In previous work, we showed that the critical engagement with a decision sup-
port system during its implementation by a project team is an important an-
tecedent for the successful later use of the technology. However, the mechanisms
that trigger such critical engagement are so far not well understood. Drawing
on Heidegger’s modes of Being-in-the-world this paper provides a theoretical
frame to understand trigger mechanisms of critical deliberation in more detail.
In particular, I argue that critical engagement is triggered by breakdowns dur-
ing which the system becomes unavailable for use. Such breakdowns, in turn,
enable thematic deliberation which leads to critical engagement with the de-
cision support system. I also argue that breakdowns can alternatively lead to
periods of theoretical detachment during which the meaningful use of the deci-
sion support system and meaningful manipulations of the system to implement
it for a specific decision making purpose are not possible. To provide first evi-
dence for these mechanisms, I will analyze a number of episodes that I observed
while participating in a large-scale decision support system implementation ef-
fort on a major construction project. By developing and illustrating how critical
engagement is triggered by breakdowns, the paper contributes to our in depth
understanding of grassroots decision support system implementations by project
teams.
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1. Introduction
In the last years, the project organization research community has made
great progress in understanding innovation processes at the industry level ac-
counting for the industrys fragmented and diverse structure (Taylor, 2007; Tay-
lor and Levitt, 2007; Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Gann and Salter, 2000). However,
despite all these successes, empirical studies at the project level still document
great struggles with the adoption and effective use of IT applications (Hart-
mann et al., 2008; Galloway, 2006). Understanding about these struggles and
in general about the implementation dynamics at the project level is, however,
of essential importance. Research in project-based industries shows that prac-
titioners need to explore new technologies on single projects before company
executive research and development R&D departments can disseminate them
through the whole company (Brady and Davies, 2004). Additionally, due to the
unique nature of many projects it is often not even possible to develop stan-
dard use procedures that can be implemented in a top-down manner. Thus,
the existing, strategic, top-down innovation understanding of the construction
research community needs to be complemented by a better understanding of
bottom-up implementation processes at the operational project level.
To further this understanding about bottom up processes, we developed a
theoretical model that describes project-based implementation dynamics at the
micro-level of a project team(Hartmann and Levitt, 2010). Based on this model,
we showed that the project-based implementation of decision support systems
is a highly iterative process of making sense of how the system can help in the
current context and of implementing the system to enable the previously identi-
fied possibilities (Hartmann, 2011; Hartmann et al., 2012). We also showed that
the critical engagement with a decision support system during its implementa-
tion within a project organization is an important antecedent for the successful
later use of the technology. We showed that critical engagement starts new
implementation cycles to improve the use of a system within a project based
setting Hartmann and Fischer (2009). The mechanisms that trigger such critical
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engagement, however, are so far not well understood. Drawing on Heidegger’s
three modes of Being-in-the-world this paper provides a theoretical frame to
understand these triggering mechanisms in more detail. In particular, I argue
that critical engagement is triggered by thematic deliberation after breakdowns
during which the system become unavailable to support decisions in the way
it was intended to. To provide first evidence for these mechanisms, I analyzed
a number of episodes that I observed while participating in a large-scale deci-
sion support system implementation effort for a major construction project. By
developing and illustrating how critical engagement is triggered, the paper con-
tributes to our in depth understanding of implementations by project teams. In
particular, this paper provides a link between earlier predictive theories about
the importance of resistance for the success of implementations (Hartmann and
Fischer, 2009) and explanatory theories about the ongoing sense-making about
the decision support system during implementations (Hartmann, 2011; Hart-
mann and Levitt, 2010).
The paper is structured as follows: It starts with an introduction in the
micro-dynamics of decision support systems at the project team level. After-
ward, the paper introduces Heidegger’s fundamental modes of existence. After a
short description of the applied research method, the paper will use these modes
to explain how critical engagement was or was not triggered using episodes from
a longitudinal case study. The paper closes with a discussion about the theo-
retical and practical implications of the presented work.
2. Micro-dynamics of decision support systems at the project level:
Grassroots theories
To improve the understanding about bottom-up implementation processes,
researchers first need an in-depth understanding of how engineering project
teams are organized. Projects organize workforce detached from the formal
hierarchy of an engineering company. This hierarchical detachment, in turn,
allows project team members to make the creative and timely decisions needed
to produce unique products of the built environment without the need to esca-
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late decisions or possible problems to upper level managers. However, the same
detachment, oftentimes, impedes the top-down implementation of new technolo-
gies, since upper level managers lack an in-depth understanding of local work
processes and environments (Brady and Davies, 2004). Therefore, it is impor-
tant that project team members drive the implementation of new technologies
from the bottom-up.
Models that describe such bottom-up processes need to account for four char-
acteristics that are intrinsic to the implementation process of decision support
systems by project teams:
• Systems supporting decision making at the operational level pf projects
consist of bundles of software, hardware, and processes that can be used in
different ways (Bidgoli, 2003; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994; Rice and Rogers,
1980). Thus, it is often unclear how to configure software, hardware, and
processes to support specific decision making tasks. The application of
different configurations of software, hardware, and processes can often
lead to the same outcome; alternatively, the use of the same configuration
can result in different outcomes.
• Upper management cannot mandate the effective use of an IT system to
support project-based decision making. Even though project team mem-
bers have the opportunity to adopt and use the system, they can continue
to make decisions without using it. There is no easy way for the upper
management to control whether or not a system is used at all or used
efficiently.
• Due to the high levels of reciprocal interdependence between many project
tasks, project team members are dependent on information updates from
other members (Thompson, 2003; Gann and Salter, 2000; Levitt et al.,
1999). Therefore, the successful implementation of a decision support
system by a project team depends on a high level of integration of the
system within the team.
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Figure 1: A summary and overview of the previously developed grassroots theories of decision
support implementation by project teams. The figure shows the overall theory and how the
overall model is covered by previous publications. It also indicates the focus of this paper.
• A project team is a temporary organization. Therefore, project teams
have only limited time to develop procedures about how to use a new
decision support system. Further, how the members of the team define
various attributes of the decision support system will vary throughout the
project. A stable institutionalization (Scott, 1995) of the use of a decision
support system is thus unlikely.
To account for these characteristics, we have developed a grassroots theory
to describe the dynamics of decision support systems by project teams summa-
rized. At the core of the theory is the grassroots model of technology imple-
mentation that is summarized in Figure 1 (Hartmann, 2008). Building upon
sense-making theory (Weick, 1995; Berger and Luckmann, 2007), the model ex-
plains how members of a project team mutually generate the spirit of a decision
support system that captures the outcomes of the project team members sense-
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making processes about the system in the local project environment. This spirit
describes the subjective characteristics of such systems as they are jointly per-
ceived by the members of the project team (Majchrzak et al., 2000; DeSanctis
and Poole, 1994). The model asserts that this spirit is different from the tech-
nical reality i.e., the real potential of the system to improve the work processes
and the real technical knowledge that is needed to implement the system in the
respective project environment. The model assumes that the two constructs of
technical reality and spirit are never entirely identical, so that there exists a gap
between them. The size of this gap is influenced by how accurately the spirit -
the outcome of the project teams sensemaking - describes the technical reality.
The model then asserts that the size of the gap between the objective tech-
nical reality of the system in use versus the subjective spirit that is established
influences how project team members perceive the control they have over the
implementation and how they perceive the opportunity that the system offers
them to improve decision making tasks. The model posits that project team
members who, due to a small gap between the spirit and the technical reality,
gain a feeling of control over the implementation of the system and who per-
ceive that the system offers opportunities to improve their decision making tasks
maximize the possible benefits the technology offers during implementation. In
contrast, if the gap is large the model predicts that project team members con-
clude that they do not have control over the implementation and that they do
not think that the system is an opportunity are likely to try to minimize the ex-
pected negative consequences of the technology implementation. In these cases,
project team members are not likely to utilize the new system and try to avoid
using it as much as possible.
The developed model also posits that the above described process is highly it-
erative. Through the use of the decision support system, project team members
will gain new knowledge. With this new knowledge, the subjective character-
istics of the used system and, hence the system’s spirit will also change. This
change, in turn, influences the gap between the spirit and the technical reality.
Empirical studies of the implementation of decision support systems by project
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teams, showed that use mainly influences technical knowledge, but also project
task related knowledge (Hartmann, 2011; Hartmann et al., 2012).
Further theoretical elaborations on the model then suggest that resistance is
necessary for individuals to understand, engage with, and use new technologies
(Hartmann and Fischer, 2009). Therefore, these elaborations suggest to treat
user resistance not as a reaction to a change that involves mistrust, but as a
rejection of parts of the change based on careful and thoughtful investigation of
aspects of the change (Knowles and Linn, 2004; Ford et al., 2008). The grass-
roots model assumes that, during each of the above described iterations, change
recipients pursue parts of a proposed change and reject other parts (Wegener
et al., 2004). Thoughtfulness is the important attribute that helps change recip-
ients to determine what to pursue and what to reject. Thoughtfulness, in turn,
is triggered by resistance because only resistance enables project team members
to critically engage with the change. Additionally, user resistance, not only trig-
gers the above described iterations, but also increases process awareness, serves
as an early warning system about issues and expectations, and helps to evaluate
new processes around a technology. From a grassroots perspective, resistance
should, hence, be treated as an intrinsic characteristic of the change process
that serves as an important and necessary function to ensure a meaningful and
thoughtful implementation.
All together, these previous theories can provide a good lens to understand
decision support system implementation by project teams. However, so far it is
not yet well understood how critical engagement with a implemented decision
support system is triggered. This paper sets out to increase understanding
about this question. To this end, it will draw in Heidegger’s theory of being
in the world (Heidegger, 1963). The next section will provide a brief overview
about this theory.
3. Being-in-the-world: Heidegger’s fundamental modes of existence
Heidegger suggests that there is a continuum of how we engage with the
world that ranges from complete immersion to detachment (Figure 2). On this
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continuum immersion is the most basic and natural form. Acting immersed
means that we are, in first instance, not separated with the objects and other
human beings that surround us. We unconsciously act by immediately antici-
pating what action to conduct next. Being immersed in such a way, we lack the
ability to reflect about situations using object-subject relations to abstract as-
pects of systems or tools, or in Dreyfuss’s translation of Heidegger, equipment,
we use to support our ongoing activities (Dreyfus, 1991, p.78).
According to Heidegger, we will only leave this basic mode of being if we
encounter interruptions or breakdowns that forcefully stop our immersed activ-
ities. In most cases, we are able to deal with a temporary breakdown using the
second mode of being: involved thematic deliberation (Dreyfus, 1991). During
thematic deliberation, we attend to the breakdown by starting to pay deliberate
attention to what we do and how equipment, helps us to do so. In this mode,
we are still involved in practical activity, but we now start to heedfully attend
to what we do. The relational whole of our current practice temporary moves
into view. This, in turn, enables us to derive plans for the use of equipment in
the future. Dependent on the severity of the disruption these plans will have a
short term or long term focus.
If the breakdown becomes to sever, we enter the third mode of being: theo-
retical detachment. In this mode we become “too paralyzed to act” (Sandberg
and Tsoukas, 2011, p.2011). We have to stop whatever we are doing and start
to try to understand the abstract properties of the situation at hand by de-
taching us from the actions we were unconsciously involved with. Through this
detachment, however, we loose the context of the actions we were involved in
previously. Hence, we will no longer be able to meaningfully manipulate equip-
ment to appropriate it to the context at hand. To phenomenologically illustrate
the above describe modes of being-in-the-world, we will use the modes to ana-
lyze a number of episodes from a decision support system implementation effort
that we observed in the next section.
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Figure 2: Application of Heidegger’s modes of being to the implementation of decision support
systems by project teams. Temporary breakdowns enable users to involve in thematic deliber-
ation which allows the development of long term and short term plans for the implementation.
Complete breakdowns will lead to theoretically detachment from the actual decision making
context. In this mode, no meaningful implementation steps are possible.
4. Evidential episodes from a longitudinal case study of technology
implementation
4.1. Research Method and Case Introduction
The field study used to illustrate the above described theoretical modes of
being was concerned with the design phase of a major subway-reconstruction
project in a metropolitan city in the United States. The same field study has
already served well to illustrate previously developed parts of the grassroots
model (Hartmann, 2008, 2011) and, hence, has been analyzed from a number
of different theoretical angles. Therefore, the case serves not only to illustrate
the here developed theory, but also helps to understand the different parts of
the grassroots theory in context.
The project serves as a great example of the previously described character-
istics of project teams and decision support systems. The client of this project –
the subway department of the metropolitan city – had subcontracted the design
of the project to several design companies. To obtain support with manag-
ing this design effort, the subway department hired a consulting construction
management (CCM) team to review the incoming designs. This CCM team
represents the study’s organizational unit of observation.
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The CCM team was lead by a project director under whom a number of
project managers worked. Despite this two-level hierarchical structure, the
project managers were responsible for making their own decisions with respect
to most of the CCM teams work tasks. The role of the project director was
mainly limited to communicating the project managers decisions to the other
project stakeholders. Additionally, the work of the project managers was sup-
ported by a number of office engineers, who, though they formally reported
to the project managers, were expected to work independently on tasks. Next
to its flat hierarchical structure, another important characteristic of the CCM
team was that few common routines existed at the start of the project. The
CCM team was a joint venture founded specifically for this project, and few of
its members had worked together previously.
To support its design review and constructability analysis tasks, the CCM
team decided to utilize a decision support system to better understand project
complexities. This system, a so-called 4D system (Hartmann et al., 2008; Hart-
mann and Fischer, 2007), was designed to simulate and visualize the planned
reconstruction sequence, starting with the existing conditions at the construc-
tion site and ending with the proposed final conditions of the project. To be able
to successfully use the 4D system, the project managers needed to extensively
configure the tool. In particular, it was important- to generate three-dimensional
(3D) models and schedules that would allow for meaningful visual simulations
of construction sequences. Hence, this case, with its absence of stable working
routines within the CCM team and the necessity to configure the 4D system,
is ideal to further an understanding of how actors influence the implementation
of a decision support system in complex project-team settings.
The longitudinal case data presented in this paper were collected during a
one-year participatory field study with the above described CCM team. Follow-
ing the main idea of participatory research methodology (Jorgensen, 1989), the
writer tried to get as involved in the daily project-management work as possi-
ble. This allowed the writer to normalize his role as a researcher by becoming a
member of the project team, which is an important requirement for longitudinal
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case studies. The participatory involvement allowed for deep insights into who
influenced the implementation of the decision support system at different times
during the implementation and how the influence of different actors changed
over time.
During the field work, data was collected from different sources and inter-
esting observations related to the configuration or use of the decision support
system were constantly recorded in a field journal. The writer also conducted
formal interviews with project participants that were recorded as thoroughly as
possible in the same journal. Additionally, a large number of documents were
collected, including approximately 100 different streams of electronic communi-
cations related to the decision support system, 26 meeting minutes summarizing
decision support system related meetings, and eleven presentations slide-shows
that either directly focused on issues related to the decision support system or
that involved outputs of the decision support system to support the communi-
cation of other project-related issues.
To derive a theory from the vast amount of qualitative data that was col-
lected during the participatory research, a grounded research approach was
applied (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Already, during the field work, the writer
started to summarize all applications of the decision support system that were
observed in a separate notebook in an effort of theoretical memoing (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967). For each identified application, the actors that were involved,
the configuration steps the actors took, and how the actors eventually used the
decision support system to inform their decisions were traced. After leaving the
field, a formal data-organization framework was developed and used to further
structure the data. This effort resulted in narratives of 4D system configurations
organized in several configuration episodes.
The rest of this section will describe a number of the identified episodes dur-
ing the implementation process of this 4D system to illustrate how Heidegger’s
modes of being help to understand the implementation dynamics observed.
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4.2. Start of the Implementation: Theoretical Reflection
At the beginning of the implementation, the CCM team hired a computer-
visualization company to create the 3D models that are necessary as a technical
input to the 4D system. Concurrently, to the modeling effort of the visualization
company, the CCM team conducted regular meetings to discuss the progress of
the modeling effort. Because of the detachment of the modeling work with the
ongoing project management activities, these 4D related meetings were mainly
focused on discussing abstract characteristics of a 4D system. A clear under-
standing of how the models could be used on the project could not be developed.
Instead, the project managers developed their own abstract properties of the
4D system. For example, in an effort to control the ongoing 3D modeling efforts
better, the project managers developed abstract metrics to measure progress.
These metrics described the progress of modeling by dividing the project into
logical physical sections describing the different stations using the letter of the
respective subway lines (AC line, RW line). For each of these stations they
then tracked an abstract percentage of how much of the model for each line was
completed. This abstract property “percentage complete”, however, was not
related in a meaningful way to how the 3D models should be used in the 4D
system to support project management.
The purely theoretical reflections described above, prevented the CCM team
to develop meaningful models together with the visualization team. Both sides,
the project manager and the visualization specialists remained in a mode of
theoretical deliberation. Only as outsiders from a software company that sold
a 4D model application got involved, this state of theoretical deliberation could
be resolved. With the help of the experts from the software company, the CCM
team realized that it was not possible to establish visualizations of construction
sequences with the generated 3D models. The models were simply in a too
coarse level of detail that did not allow to meaningfully distinguish between
different construction activities.
To solve this situation, the CCM team and the technology manager decided
to stop working with the visualization company. Members of the CCM team
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started to explore the technical problems from a project-task background. They
decided to identify in-house personnel with both project management and tech-
nical knowledge about 3D modeling. Then, the team started a configuration
phase of the 4D system that allowed for a number of successful applications of
the system that is described in the following sub-section.
4.3. Absorbed Coping
Soon after the first meaningful 3D models became available, the CCM team
started to use the 4D system to support ongoing project management decision
making tasks. For example, one of the CCM teams project managers had worked
on evaluating whether it was possible to renovate one of the projects subway
stations while maintaining the traffic on the street above. However, with the
existing project documentation material, it was not easy to conduct this evalu-
ation. The existing two-dimensional (2D) drawings represented the street level
and the subway station level on two different drawing sheets. Therefore, the
project manager was not able to quickly determine the opening size required to
install the subway station underneath by using the station-level drawing, nor
was he able to determine how much of the street would be covered by the open-
ing. By using the measurement feature provided by the 4D system with the 3D
model that represented the street and subway station levels, project manager A
was able to extract the required information in less than ten minutes from the
4D system. He was now quickly able to determine that the required 11-ft traffic
lane could be maintained and was able to make the decision that the respective
subway station design was constructable.
A second example shows an unintended successful use of the 4D system. In
one of the ongoing 4D meetings, the CCM team looked at the existing 3D models
to ensure that the model adequately represented the planned construction work.
Interestingly, this meeting turned into an actual project-management meeting,
during which project managers started to evaluate possible ways to construct a
tunnel connecting two different subway lines underground.
In both above examples, project managers did no longer think about the
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characteristics of the 4D system, even if this was the initial intention as in the
second example above. This is, for example, illustrated well by project managers
referring to the system as 4D, while both of the above applications of the model
were not using any visualization function showing planned construction: the
4D aspect of the system . During these application, the project managers still
appropriated the 4D system to the task at hand, e.g., they used the measurement
function to measure the width of the street or they used the navigation function
to understand the changed design. However, while they appropriated the system
project managers were not aware of the 4D system itself and focused on the
project management decision making tasks.
4.4. Deliberate Coping: Reflective Planning
At the start of this episode, the subway department decided to significantly
change the design of the project to reduce the estimated costs of the project.
These changes, in turn, rendered portions of the existing 3D models obsolete.
This triggered a number of questions among the CCM team members about the
value of the 4D system that none of the team members had thought of before.
This caused a serious disturbance in the use of the 4D system, because CCM
team members started to question its functionality within the given context.
The consecutive discussions were mainly shaped by one of the project man-
agers. His opinion can be best assessed by the following statement:
To be honest, I am not sure any longer whether it makes sense to apply a
4D system on a construction project. So far we spent more than $100,000 to
create all these 3D models and we have hardly used them to support our work.
I mean, yes we looked at the model, but it is mainly pretty pictures that do not
really help to make decisions. And now with the value engineering we would need
to remodel 70% of the 3D and I do not see how this can be defended in front
of the client who pays for it. The 3D modeling process necessary is simply too
expensive for us as construction managers to do (Project manager C, personal
communication, 2005).
The other team members also began to support this opinion. On multi-
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ple occasions, team members stated their concerns of how to explain the large
amount of money the team had already spent on the 4D system to the subway
department.
These discussions triggered a deliberate effort to understand the 4D system
in relation to the costs of the modeling effort required. This deliberation revealed
that though the design company had redesigned large parts of the project, half
of the previously created 3D models represented the existing conditions of the
project site before the start of construction activities. Hence, the part of the 3D
model that represented these parts did not needed to be remodeled. The CCM
team prepared a number of graphs and figures summarizing the 3D modeling
effort and detailing its costs. All the deliberation, however, was within the con-
text of using the 4D system to support project management tasks. All financial
considerations were discussed in light of the previously successful applications
of the 4D system.
The deliberation, in turn, allowed the CCM team to develop a short term
plan of how to make the 4D system financially working on the project. The
3D modelers were asked to remodel the changed design, while the CCM team
implemented a number of processes to reduce and control the costs of the 3D
modeling effort. One part of these new processes was that the team decided
that the modeling of new parts of the project should be discussed with project
managers in detail to make sure that all models would also be used to support
project-management decisions. Further, the CCM team started to track the
costs of the modeling effort on a continuous basis. Additionally, the CCM
team developed a number of guidelines that described processes of using the
4D system and how to create schedules and 3D models as input for the system.
Finally, the CCM team trained an office engineer in how to use the system.
Successively, the members of the CCM team started to intensively use the
4D system to visualize the projects complicated areas. The team used the model
to simulate and plan construction sequences and to evaluate whether the new
design could be constructed within the tight project conditions within a mode
that can be best described again as absorbed coping.
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4.5. Deliberate Coping: Long Range Planning
This episode describes another breakdown, this time more severe as the
CCM team failed to use the 4D system. Whereas, in the previous episodes,
the CCM team mainly used the 4D system to support internal decisions of
the team, in this episode, the CCM team decided to additionally support its
communications with the client. The CCM team committed to a client request
to support one of its public relations presentations with the 4D system. This
presentation was a great failure because the CCM team was not able to generate
a visually appealing 4D visualization to support the communication for this
meeting. Although the CCM team had previously configured the 4D system
to be able to flexibly support project management decision-making tasks, it
was not suited to support 4D visualizations for presentations to project-team
outsiders.
The client of the project reacted to the CCM teams failed attempt by threat-
ening to stop financing the effort if the CCM team could not show its ability to
effectively use the 4D system. The following excerpt from an e-mail illustrates
this episode.
We had a major presentation today with the client. Once again, conversion
of the [3D] model files to [the 4D system] proved to be an insurmountable chal-
lenge. The client made it very clear today, [that] if we are unable to show the
value of a 4D model by next Thursday, they will no longer provide monetary
support for this effort (Project manager D, personal communication, 2006).
After the failed presentation, the CCM team started to deliberate why the
4D system was not working. Some members concluded that the software was
the problem and that the CCM team should acquire different software that
according to the Technology Manager
... has now become the preferred software solution for 4D Modeling across
the industry (Technology manager, personal communication, 2006).
Simultaneously, other members of the CCM team argued that the problem
was not with the 4D software itself but with the process of converting 3D models
as input for the 4D application:
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[I] think the main issue we had yesterday was that [3D modeler A] was not
properly shown how to organize and convert the model [... to omit unnecessary
details for a presentation- ...], and since [3D modeler B] was out for the week
[3D modeler A] didnt have someone to confer with (Office engineer, personal
communication, 2006).
In the end, the CCM team decided to acquire an alternative 4D software
system following the recommendations of the more experienced team members.
This decision was mainly made on a long-term background. Overall, the CCM
team expected that the switch to the new software would allow them to more
consistently and flexibly support project management decision tasks.
After the acquisition of the new software, the CCM team used the 4D system
successfully to support a number of presentations to team outsiders, as the
following excerpt from an interview with one of the project managers illustrates:
Oh yes we still use the 4D system. Last week we just had an outstanding
success. We invited a number of people from [the subway department] over to
review the latest schedule that we created for the [one of the subway lines]. By
seeing the schedule simulated within the model, they were able to sign off on our
plan within 3 hours. This process would have usually lasted 3 weeks if not longer
(Project manager A, personal communication, 2007).
Another interview with the CCM teams project director further underlines
this fact:
...4D is useful for construction planning and we have used it within the last
months a number of times. At the beginning we were overenthusiastic and did
not know how to use 4D right. We spent a lot of money on modeling things
we really did not need to see in the model. But in the end, 4D is very helpful
(Project director, personal communication, 2007).
5. Discussion
If nothing more the above episodes show well that Heidegger’s modes of
being are helpful to understand the dynamics during the implementation of
decision support systems by project teams. The first episode describes, how
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pure theoretical deliberation fails to achieve a successful implementation. In this
phase, the CCM team could only theoretically discuss about the characteristics
of the 4D system without meaningfully relate it to the decision making context
at hand. This is in line with the grassroots model that describes use as one
of the important factors to consider. During such phases, it seems to be likely
that the gap between the perceived spirit of the system and the project reality
growth which will hinder a successful implementation. On the case project, this
deadlock could only be broken, by outsiders that actually attempted to use the
created 3D models for the initially intended purpose.
At the same time, the above episodes also show that during normal use
of the system, project managers did not deliberate about the aspects of the
system to improve the implementation. Only after temporary breakdowns of
the 4D system through malfunction of the tool or other disturbances, such as
the re-design of the subway station that made some of the existing 3D models
obsolete, members of the CCM team started to deliberate about the aspects
of the 4D system for the current decision making context. Only in situations
in which the 4D system broke down its various references to the situation at
hand showed up. In these situations, the characteristics and properties of the
4D system became clearly visible to the CCM team and its various references
to the decision making context of the project showed up. This allowed project
team members to then detach themselves from the ongoing use situation and
develop new insights. These insights, in turn led to adjustments of the overall
implementation of the system, such as the introduction of more cost efficient
modeling procedures or the switch to different software systems.
In conclusion, the application of Heidegger’s modes of being to understand
the implementation characteristics allowed to further provide more detail for
the grassroots model of decision support implementations by project teams.
Previous research shows that implementations in these contexts can be highly
iterative and need to be iterative to be successful because the knowledge of
the involved persons about the meaning of the system for the current context
changes (Hartmann, 2011; Hartmann et al., 2012). This paper complements
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these insights by showing how new iterations can be triggered and by providing
more details in the mechanisms of how new knowledge is developed by the
implementing members of a project team.
Understanding decision support implementations from the lens of Heideg-
ger’s modes of being offers a number of benefits to organizational practice.
Being aware of how the modes of being influence the implementation helps
project managers that intend to use a decision support system and technology
specialists that manage implementations to better organize their efforts. To
support relative standard problems by implementing decision support systems
it seems obvious to try to avoid any form of disruption so that project managers
can use the decision support system while being immersed in project manage-
ment practice. However, once the decisions to be supported become more and
more complex it might be a good strategy to intentionally cause temporary and
complete breakdowns that allow everybody involved in the implementation to
deliberate about the meaning of the system in the current context. However,
moments of deliberation and use should be balanced carefully. In case delib-
eration gets too detached from ongoing project management practice, it will
no longer be possible to meaningfully relate the system to the existing decision
making context. This situation might then, in turn, lead to a theoretical dead-
lock similar to the one observed at the beginning of the implementation on the
test case project.
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